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IN Morristown, New Jersey, five housewives, including an elderly
widow, sat in the shovel of a bulldozer for more than an hour to
protest the building of an interstate highway through a section of
town occupied by historic homes. Mrs. Cooke, the widow, sat in the
shovel sobbing softly as police demanded that the women move. "This
is such a lovely town," she said, "I do not know what will become of
it." After repeated threats of arrest, the women finally gave way and
the bulldozer began ripping into a frame house a block from a man-
sion where Washington spent a winter in 1779. The State Highway
Department was unmoved by the protest. A spokesman said: "These
women just aren't looking at the big picture. Our route has been ap-
proved, and we are going through with it."
In Mt. Vernon, New York, on the same day, it was reported that
work on widening a parkway was resumed after the failure of a dem-
onstration by residents. A few days before, dozens of housewives and
businessmen, angered that age-old trees were to be torn down for the
highway, had stationed themselves at dawn in front of heavy ma-
chinery used in building the highway. Police demanded that they
leave and workmen started a bulldozer roaring toward the residents,
who linked arms and refused to budge. The police pulled the line
apart, twisting arms and legs. Men in business suits fell down, women's
handbags flew open, and fifteen persons, who had made themselves
dead weight on the ground, were finally carried away bodily. Sixteen
persons were arrested, including a rabbi, two pregnant women, and
the wife of a Westchester County Supervisor. A New York Transit
Police Captain, also a resident, was arrested for punching a police-
man. Children in tears ran behind screaming mothers held by police-
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men. Governor Rockefeller halted work on the highway but a few days
later it was resumed.
These stories are typical of many others. In New York City resi-
dents protested the building of an expressway across lower Manhattan.
In Long Beach, Long Island, citizens turned out to object to a pro-
posal by Army engineers to build a ten-mile long, 100-foot wide sand
dune. Residents claimed that the sand dune, intended as a protection
against storms, would cut the communities off from the beach and
change their entire character. In California incensed citizens suc-
ceeded in postponing a proposed freeway through Golden Gate Park.
In Philadelphia mothers and children blockaded a major road which
they said had been turned into a speedway. In Massachusetts students
and residents of Cambridge stood vigil to save 127 sycamores along
the Charles River. In Arizona there is controversy of national propor-
tions over proposed dams which it is said would permanently alter
the character and appearance of Grand Canyon. In Northern Cali-
fornia some of the finest remaining stands of coastal redwoods are
threatened. Most recently local citizens and conservation groups lost
a battle to prevent the building of an interstate highway on Chestnut
Ridge near Bedford, New York. The federal highway administrator
contended that a highway actually improves woodlands; the woods are
opened up "to all the people" and construction itself adds to beauty;
boulders pushed into streams make eddies for fish, and embankments
create lakes, he said. Thousands of people were reported to have pro-
tested.
It might seem easy to dismiss these protests as a form of contagion,
perhaps inspired by the example of the civil rights movement,
and perhaps also by the academic and student demonstrations
against American foreign policy. But I think we can see something
more here. There is indeed a general trend toward direct political
expression and pressure as an alternative to reliance on the reg-
ular processes of representative government. But, in addition, the
controversies which I have described do not lie in such typically po-
litical areas as civil rights, foreign policy, or the draft. Instead, they
involve the supposedly non-political, scientific areas of planning. The
planning process, theoretically the realm of the detached expert, has
been made political by the direct action of citizens.
Some of the reasons for this trend, if it is a trend, can be identified.
The activities and decisions of government have a growing impact
upon the lives of citizens. As the United States becomes more crowded
and more complex, the process of government becomes a vast jigsaw
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puzzle in which every move in one area affects many other areas. At
the same time, it seems increasingly difficult for the citizen to make
effective contact with government. Citizens are rarely informed when
the agency makes its decision; their first notice is often the roar of
a bulldozer. Even when notice is available many agencies have no
regular procedures for hearing citizens' protests. Nor are agencies
easily controlled through elections; most agency officials are appointed
rather than elected. Nor does there appear to be much hope of relief
from the law and the courts. Many of the demonstrations described
above were accompanied by legal action of one sort or another but
the courts almost uniformly refuse to interfere. Lawyers who prac-
tice before government agencies and students of administrative law
are often as baffled as local demonstrators.
It is interesting to note a parallel between the concerns of the
ordinary citizen, or the practicing lawyer, and the so-called "New
Left." One of the chief concerns of the "New Left" is the alienation
of government from the people, and lack of adequate popular par-
-ticipation in governmental decision making. Organizations like Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society are allies of the housewives of Morris-
town in that they want local people to have some say in the actions
of the highway builders. SDS is also like the housewives in that it
has figured out no method better than demonstration by which such
participation can be brought about.
The word method is crucial. From the years of the New Deal on-
ward, it has become increasingly an article of faith among students
of government that American society needs more planning. A large
number of books expound the thesis that planning could solve many
of our most acute social problems; some, like B. F. Skinner's Walden
Two, see planning as the way to a new Utopia. An equally large num-
ber of books, all of them seemingly with the title Planning, Freedom,
and Democracy, undertake to show that there is no conflict among
'the ideals mentioned in their titles. A glow of optimism surrounds
this' literature. But although the philosophers, political scientists and
economists have thought voluminously about planning, lawyers, who
are concerned with how to do things, have not thought enough. In
.consequence, we have much planning, but no adequate means for
-planning-no adequate law for planning.
Recently there have been signs that the law is about to embark in
new directions. In two recent decisions, one concerning a proposed
power facility to be built by Consolidated Edison at Storm King
Mountain along the Hudson River, and the other dealing with the
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protest of the United Church of Christ against the renewal of a tele-
vision license to a Mississippi company allegedly guilty of racial dis-
crimination, the federal courts have radically broadened citizen par-
ticipation in governmental decision making and moved toward basic
changes in the substantive law of planning. These decisions are the
culmination of others which have been little noted. Individually or
together, they do not state an underlying theory for the law. But
perhaps they point the way.
This article is intended as a preface to the coming development
of a system of law for the planned society. It begins by attempting
to diagnose some sources of trouble in our present law of planning
and allocation-now included within the broad and misnamed cate-
gory of Administrative Law. Second, the article suggests some of the
consequences of the law's present inadequacy. Third, it examines what
appear to be new trends in the law. And finally, it makes an effort
to show what the law must do to face up to the problems and dilem-
mas which planning presents. How do we preserve democratic par.
ticipation in the decision-making process-a process that is no longer
effectively controlled by elected legislatures? How can planning en-
compass adequately the many values of American society and not
just a few limited objectives at the expense of others? How can we
preserve an unplanned area for individual development and freedom
of choice-an area where constitutional protection of pluralism and
privacy can still be effective? I do not offer solutions to these problems.
I do suggest that facing up to these problems offers our best hope of
solving them.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A MYTHOLOGY FOR AN AMBIVALENT NATION
A. Backwards Into Planning
One of the major developments of the twentieth century in all in-
dustrial countries has been the growth of centralized planning and
allocation of resources. This phenomenon has transcended differences
in political and economic systems. It is a prime element of socialist
societies like the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.
It has also evolved in democratic countries like Sweden and it existed
in the totalitarian dictatorships of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
The inherent nature of a complex industrial society forces this de-
velopment regardless of the theories or wishes of the people con-
cerned.
In the United States the political and economic tradition inherited
from the nineteenth century was dead set against planning and allo-
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cation-perhaps more strongly than in any other country in the world.
This tradition did not, however, enable the United States to resist the
inevitable. It merely affected the way in which the inevitable arrived.
Perhaps the earliest development was the growth of private allocation
and planning in the form of large corporations and trusts in indus-
tries like oil and rail transportation. Businessmen were the active
forces of collectivism and planning in the United States. In time they
forced the hand of government. Governmental regulation, such as the
Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, was designed to place
some degree of public control on private systems of planning and al-
location. But the United States, consciously or unconsciously, sought
to maintain to the greatest extent possible the free enterprise system.
To this end private business was, wherever possible, given jobs to do
that government might have carried out itself. Hence private entre-
preneurs were permitted to fly the nation's air routes, broadcast over
the government-owned airways, and control much of the hydroelectric
power of the nation's rivers. A compromise has been worked out in
which such private enterprise operates public services for profit but
in "the public interest."
The substantive and procedural law created to accompany these
developments grew up in haphazard fashion with little theory to guide
it. When the federal government first undertook regulation in a major
way, in the case of the railroads, Congress created the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to deal with this specific problem. The Commis-
sion was endowed with legislative, executive and judicial powers,
headed by a group of commissioners supposedly experts in their field.
It proved to be the archetype of the administrative agencies to come.
As each new problem arose, Congress created a new agency to deal
with it or assigned the function to an existing regulatory agency. The
nature of the functions, however, kept changing. The job of the ICC
was to regulate, that is, to police activities which otherwise remained
essentially private. The job of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion was roughly similar. On the other hand, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, although described as if it were merely regu-
lating traffic on the airways, engages not only in regulation but also
in allocation; it licenses private companies to use the scarce and valu-
able channels of the radio spectrum. Likewise the Civil Aeronautics
Board allocates routes for air transportation and the Federal Power
Commission allocates natural gas pipeline routes and hydroelectric
sites. Still further from the original function of regulation is the
growing responsibility of some agencies to engage in planning. Some-
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times this is an indirect, or unspoken, consequence of an agency's
assigned job; the CAB unavoidably plans the nation's air transporta-
tion system. Sometimes an agency's responsibility for planning is made
almost explicit; the FPC may approve only hydroelectric projects
which are best adapted to a comprehensive plan for a river valley;
nothing is said, however, about who makes the plan. Often the same
agency combines regulatory duties with allocation and planning
powers: the comfortable and traditional ICC was given authority over
the trucking industry with power to allocate routes and thus plan for
the nation's motor transportation needs. In comparing the ICC's
original regulatory role with its new role as arbiter of motor trans-
portation, we see an illustration of how the familiar agency form
could be left unchanged while the agency was given new responsi-
bilities which were (although Congress would not acknowledge the
fact) radically different from the old.
Every development in the field of planning has taken place in
characteristically ad hoc fashion. Usually it was necessary to fight
powerful and vocal defenders of unregulated corporate power. Con-
sequently Congress never adopted any general approach to planning;
quite the contrary, the very idea was shunned and planning and al-
location came disguised as regulation and justified either as ma-
chinery to aid the smooth functioning of free enterprise or as an
exception to the general rule of laissez faire. Thus it was that the
coming of planning was in many ways unsatisfactory to proponents
as well as opponents: the true believers in free enterprise saw the
development of planning as something dangerously insidious (and
so it was) and the advocates of planning saw the new activities of
government as half-way measures and inadequate (and so they were).
In these circumstances the governmental institutions created to deal
with planning and allocation had to be created without a candid
acknowledgment of their true function. Congress kept using the model
of the ICC no matter what function the agency was supposed to per-
form.
Just as it employed a single model for agency structure, so Congress
used but one formula for describing the agencies' tasks. Each agency
had to have an individual legislative mandate from Congress. The
mandate could not be too specific, or Congress would be doing the
agency's job itself. Nor could it be merely a general assignment of au-
thority because this would violate the constitutional doctrine against
the improper delegation of congressional power. The solution adopted
was, despite the diversity of the agencies' tasks, similar from agency
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to agency. In almost every case the agency was given a specific juris-
diction or task to perform and then directed to exercise its authority
"in the public interest," or according to "the public interest, conve-
nience and necessity," or some other formula of the same level of
generality. From time to time Congress made its wishes more par-
ticular when an individual issue was brought to its attention but
basically the agencies were left to develop the meaning of their man-
dates.
With respect to procedure Congress also used a single approach
which was applied to most of the agencies. Agency activity was forced
into three categories: adjudication, rule making, and executive or
discretionary functions. Adjudication took the model of a modified
courtroom trial. Rule making was performed in the comparatively
informal manner of a legislative hearing. Executive proceedings re-
quired no specific procedures. In the case of each, agency statutes gave
a general definition of the persons or interests entitled to participate
in agency decision making. Subject to statutes, the courts decided
who had a right to seek judicial review of agency action; the courts
also worked out, with the guidance of statutes, principles defining the
scope of review of agency action. Significantly, the categories of "rule
making" and "adjudication" fitted the function of regulation far bet-
ter than that of allocation and planning. In 1946 Congress passed the
Administrative Procedure Act, which attempted to provide a single
set of rules to govern proceedings in every type of federal agency.
Thus planning and allocation came to the United States undiffer-
entiated from regulation, and hence unaccompanied by any institu-
tions, laws or effective means to cope with the problems that planning
and allocation bring. Because we cannot admit to ourselves how
much our economy has changed, we have not been willing or able to
fashion a system of law for planning and allocation. Instead, the
present system of law has served in large part to perpetuate a my-
thology which has obscured, rather than aided, the solution of the
great problems of an ever more active government.
B. The Central Myth
In delegating power to various administrative agencies, Congress
sought to give each agency enough leeway to do its job and yet avoid
constitutional objections. Congress early discovered the utility of the
"public interest" formula, which was broad and elastic and yet satis-
fied the Supreme Court. Sometimes Congress attempted to spell out
the meaning of "the public interest" by listing a series of policies or
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factors to be taken into consideration. Occasionally Congress has laid
down a very specific instruction: television licenses should not be
given to those convicted of violating the antitrust laws. But neither
the listing of factors nor specific admonitions have significantly al-
tered the function of the formula: it operates as a virtually total
transfer of policy-making authority from Congress to the agency. The
formula marks a far-reaching change in the nature of our national
legislature. In many fields, Congress is now more a reviewing agency
than a legislative authority. Even if it meets throughout the year and
conducts its business efficiently there is no longer any possibility that
Congress can address itself, at least as an initial matter, to all of the
fundamental issues of policy that must be decided by a modern gov-
ernment. Congress is forced to limit itself to a few areas of competency
and hand over the remaining task of legislation to others while re-
taining power to investigate, to intervene, and to revise when objec-
tions are made with sufficient force.
Seventy-five years ago, it is possible that "the public interest" had
a different, more definite meaning than it does now. In times domi-
nated by economic pillage, robber barons, and piratical business tac-
tics, "the public interest" could simply mean not yielding to private
interest; perhaps it was reasonably clear what was not in the public
interest. That may have been enough for early forms of regulation.
Some writers have attempted to generalize this idea by arguing that
"the public interest" means the general good rather than good to one
particular interest. But in more recent times such notions of "the
public interest" no longer serve. Very rarely are issues so clearcut that
it is possible to say confidently what is in the general good and what
is only good for one special interest.
As the agencies have sought a meaning for the public interest, they
have come to this: the public interest is served by agency policies
which harmonize as many as possible of the competing interests
present in a given situation. Thus the objective of the CAB is to
work out policies that will be acceptable to the carriers, airline pas-
sengers, cities, and local economic interests. The FCC seeks broadcast
service that will satisfy competing demands for entertainment, news,
culture, religion, and education. The FPC in its capacity as a regu-
lator of the transmission of natural gas tries to consider the imme-
diate versus the long range need for gas, the problems of the coal
industry, and local economic requirements. In all of these cases it is
thought that the public interest requires some recognition of the
claims of each interest that can be identified. Thus the agencies have
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evolved a meaning for their charters which makes them both phi-
losopher-kings searching for the good and practical politicians trying
to please a multi-voiced rabble.
Such use of the phrase "public interest" leads to the central myth
of our present administrative law: the belief that decisions concerning
planning and allocation can be, and are, made on an objective basis.
When an agency grants a license to build a dam, revokes a television
permit, or reduces the airline service to Boston, it claims the au-
thority of an objective "public interest," a standard that apparently
can be determined by using scales and measures. As one student of
the administrative process, John Griffiths, summed it up in a final
exam:
The Progressives and New Dealers were confronted by a so-
ciety whose size, complexity, and rate of change seemed to pre-
clude effective governmental control of the kinds which they
found necessary if the traditional institutions and modes of
regulation were the limits of the public's capacity to bring public
policy to bear on the issue. Courts were too slow and too en-
cumbered in procedures designed for criminal cases or litigation
between private parties over private rights. Legislatures were too
busy, and too political to make the refined, "expert" decisions
that had to be made. The need was for an arm of government
which would be judiciary, executive and legislature all rolled
into one efficient and expert machinery for regulation. The
trouble at the root of this idea was that its proponents held to
a totally fallacious idea of how a decision can be made. They
thought there was an "administrative" decision, somewhere in
between a judicial and a legislative decision and partaking of
both, which could be made by experts-and only by experts.
Their belief in the existence of this new kind of decision led
them to think that a fourth branch of government could be de-
signed, as against which the checks and balances and other re-
straints upon the other three would not be relevant. And it led
them to ignore the problems which would arise simply because
the "administrative" decision does not exist.
The "administrative" decision was conceived of as that right
decision which will be clear to an "expert" if, without the help
(they would have said, the hindrance) of criteria, standards, rules,
etc., he confronts a vast array of raw data.
I would describe the central myth somewhat differently, for I be-
lieve that criteria play a crucial role. The myth begins with the as-
sumption that there is an objective reference for the concept of what
is best. The process of decision may therefore be carried on in ac-
cordance with standards or criteria-that is, within the limits of law.
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Courts can review decisions on the basis of these standards. The raw
materials of decision are facts: how much will the highway cost if it
follows route A or route B; how many people travel between points
X and Y; what are the engineering requirements. The decision
makers combine expert knowledge and professionalism with judicial
bearing. The tools they use for decision are science and reason. At the
core of the myth is its cardinal point: decisions are not primarily
choices between values. The entire machinery of administrative law
serves to deny the role of values in the planning process.
C. The Ancillary M1lyths
The appearance of objective choice is reinforced by the ceremony
of adjudicatory procedure. Here the crucial point is that procedure
which may be perfectly appropriate for regulatory activities becomes
foolish and deceptive when it is adapted to determining what plan-
ning would be in the "public interest." The "public interest" is
determined in most cases by a process which would appear to an ob-
server to be a "trial" at which a "verdict" is reached on the basis
of objective "facts." In the case of a television license, an air service
case, or a power site, there are "witnesses," "evidence," a "judge" and
opposing lawyers. Yet even in a comparative hearing on a television
license the agency is manifestly called upon to make a policy choice
that cannot possibly be fixed within objective limits. Trial procedure
makes sense for regulatory decisions, such as whether a company has
violated the Federal Trade Commission Act. It makes sense when
allocation is based upon objective statutory criteria that spell out who
is entitled to a particular benefit or privilege. But there cannot be a
trial of what kind of television programs Boston should have, or which
city should get a regional airport, or what plan is best for a river
valley.
In the case of the river valley, the planners must first gather facts,
but the decision about where and whether to build a dam is almost
purely a value choice. No dam is necessary in any absolute sense;
every dam has advantages and offsetting disadvantages, and the choice
may be like a vote for inexpensive electricity and against fish, or a
vote for free enterprise-expensive electricity and against public power-
cheap electricity. In such cases a "trial" is plainly inappropriate. The
case of television licenses is less obvious, for here we have a combina-
tion of objective choice and value choice. Some criteria of choice, such
as staff experience and quality of facilities, are comparatively objec-
tive; other criteria, like the desirability of one type of proposed pro-
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gramming over another, are value choices. The frustrating nature of
television hearing procedures derives from the fact that the procedures
may be faithfully followed with respect to some criteria, only to have
other (and probably decisive) criteria utterly elude them. It is be-
cause every television choice is partly a small bit of ad hoc policy
legislation that the trials are so lengthy and so meaningless.
When it is used in areas of policy making, procedure serves pri-
marily to preserve the mythology about how government operates.
It prevents us from seeing resource allocation as a process by which
some are punished and others rewarded for reasons which have no
relation to objective merits but have relation only to government
policy. It preserves the appearance of the rule of law, making it seem
that the immensely important allocation and planning process is being
carried out at all times subject to fair and equitable guiding prin-
ciples. It preserves the appearance of constitutional division of power.
By making planning choices appear to be something judicial-the ap-
plication of general rules of law to a particular situation-the appear-
ance of the constitutional scheme is retained. Administrative proce-
dure is absurdly miscast for the work of planning and allocation but
it preserves our faith in the existence of a governmental system which
we know and trust.
The mythology created by substantive and procedural law is com-
pleted by a third set of principles--the so-called doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Because of the unsystematic way in which Congress
passed statutes dealing with specific situations as they arose, it is not
surprising that there has been overlapping and conflict among dif-
ferent congressional policies and different agency jurisdictions. The
FPC may approve a dam in an area that has been set aside as a na-
tional forest; the FCC may hand out television franchises in such a
way as to create a problem of restraint of trade under the antitrust
laws. Some of these conflicts are resolved by Congress. But most of
them have to be resolved by the courts. Typically, a court is con-
fronted by a dispute between agency jurisdiction (ICC rate setting,
in the earliest case) and court jurisdiction under conflicting principles
of law (state law, in this same case). Or the conflict is between two
federal statutes, one giving power to an agency (the Shipping Board),
the other administered through the courts by another agency (the
Sherman Act, administered by the Department of Justice). In such
cases, the courts generally talk about the importance, or non-im-
portance, of "expertise," and, to a lesser extent, of "uniformity." But
this talk both confuses and disguises what is really happening. What
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is happening is that the courts in deciding issues of jurisdiction are
resolving policy conflicts which Congress created but left unresolved.
The courts are deciding which of two conflicting policies shall prevail.
Resolving conflicts is exactly what courts are supposed to do. The
troublesome fact is that by giving their decisions the confusing label
of primary jurisdiction, the courts make immensely important arbi-
trations without saying what they are actually doing and without
enunciating any standards or giving any reasons. We might like to
know why the Shipping Act prevails over the antitrust laws in one case
and not another, but we are not told. The doctrine of primary juris-
diction preserves the myth that Congress has enunciated various poli-
cies which are consistent with each other or can be made consistent
by a process of reason. It once again prevents us from seeing the
process of value choosing that takes place outside the legislature in
the course of planning. It prevents us from seeing that we have many
uncoordinated, possibly incompatible systems of planning and allo-
cation, some of which are seriously in conflict with others. But to
acknowledge the conflicts publicly would require admitting how
much planning really goes on in our society. Rather than do this, we
resolve the conflicts without admitting we are doing so, once more
burying the major problems under a reassuring appearance of law.
II. THE PRICE OF ILLUSION
We pay a heavy price for the illusions of administrative law. First,
we are forced to struggle with a system of law filled with contradic-
tions and confusion. Second, the underlying problems of planning,
being ignored, get worse. These effects are best seen with reference
to the public interest standard, adjudication procedure, and the con-
flict between planning and other ideals in a democratic society.
A. The Inadequacy of the "Public Interest" Standard
The "public interest" standard, in the meaning most agencies have
given it-a balancing of competing forces-is not a satisfactory basis
for planning. In the first place, it is ad hoc. Every balance is struck
individually, and general policy is correspondingly hard to fashion or
to follow. More important, the very concept of balancing is in one
sense a contradiction of the concept of planning. The effort to balance
pulls strongly to the status quo and against anything radical or bold.
It obscures the fact that there is a far broader range of choice than
that within which the agency habitually operates. For example, the
FCC presumably has power to decide that half the television stations
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ought to be non-profit educational ventures, assigned to universities
and foundations rather than to industrial companies. And the FCC
might require even the commercial stations to abandon their enter-
tainment format in favor of detailed news coverage and other forms
of public service. Such choices are easily forgotten under a "bal-
ancing" theory. A further deficiency of the balancing theory is that it
leads to a self-limiting method of ascertaining the facts and issues
which make up the public interest. Frequently the agency allows the
parties to present their partisan concepts of the facts, issues and the
public interest, and lets it go at that. The agency attitude is a passive
one, based on the assumption that the self-interest of competing par-
ties will inevitably bring out all of the issues. Thus balancing denies
that the agency has an affirmative duty to undertake planning on its
own initiative.
The whole concept of "the good" as representing a compromise of
interests is thus at variance with planning. Fashioning values and goals
out of existing interests prevents any really long range policy making
or planning from ever being done. It equates policy making with
satisfying the majority or the most powerful interests although the
country might benefit more from policies which favor weaker or
minority interests, or interests not yet in existence. It tends to place
emphasis on those interests which have a commercial or pecuniary
value as against intangible interests such as scenery or recreation. The
economic need for a dam, which can be presently felt, is likely to
carry more weight than considerations that urge that a river be left
as it is. In addition, the prevailing notion of the public interest allows
large private interests undue power. All too often choice becomes a
compromise among powerful private interests in which more general
but less immediate interests are neglected. In short, the most funda-
mental infirmity of the present concept of the public interest as a
guide for planning is that it defeats planning by responding only to
immediate pressures.
The "public interest" contains more specific contradictions. Most
public activities in the planning field are carried out, under our pub-
lic-private economy, by private business entities. Hence the "public
interest" must always be a compromise with these private interests.
What does the public interest mean when a private corporation en-
gages in air transportation? Because the airline is a private corpora-
tion the public interest must include the corporation's right to make
a profit, and its directors' right to make management decisions. This
private aspect of the public interest cannot necessarily be harmonized
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with the interest of consumers of transportation. The agency itself
may be implicated in these contradictions if it has, among its respon-
sibilities, the job of "promoting" the industry it must also regulate.
Thus the CAB is by one statutory direction responsible for a sound
national airline industry-requiring the agency to assume a manage-
ment outlook-while at the same time it must look after the public's
transportation needs.
These difficulties cause what is probably the most apparent failure
of the "public interest" standard: the much lamented fact that few
agencies are able to relate their decisions to any standard in a way that
helps to explain a given choice. When the FCC selects a particular
applicant for a television license or makes rules for chain broad-
casting, when the CAB chooses an airline route, or the FPC decides
between public and private power, it is very rare to find either an
agency opinion or a judicial opinion that shows us why this decision
was made instead of another equally available choice. The FCC has
attempted to overcome this problem by listing criteria for selecting
television licensees, but the criteria appear to work as rationalizations
rather than explanations. Most agencies have been unable to make
decisions which give even the appearance of consistency, fairness or
reason. It does not help to follow the practice of some agencies whereby
the commissioners decide a case and then order up an opinion written
by a professional opinion-writer whose assignment is to find or invent
any reasons he can for the commissioners' decision. The inescapable
fact is that the prevailing concept of "the public interest" does not
encourage, and may not even permit, a forthright description of the
kind of choices which planning decisions actually require.
B. The Failures of Procedure
The unsatisfactory state of substantive administrative law has led
some students of the administrative process to look for a solution, or
at least a palliative, in procedure. To the lawyer procedure carries
its own virtues. It can make certain that all points of view are heard.
It can ventilate the decision-making process by exposing it to the
light of day and thus make some forms of abuse more difficult. It
can force an agency to spell out reasons for a decision which serve
both as a check upon the agency process and as a basis for judicial
review. It can even counteract, to some degree, the murky atmosphere
of institutional decision making where decisions are evolved, rather
than made, by a series of officials none of whom bears identifiable
responsibility. But while the agencies have kept rule-making proce-
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dure reasonably flexible, adjudication procedure has grown constantly
more unworkable, leading to proposals for separation of rule making
and adjudication within agencies, closer observance of judicial proce-
dures and practices, or the establishment of an "administrative court."
The crux of the problem has already been mentioned: what works
for regulation does not and cannot work for allocation and planning.
Adjudication procedure is made ridiculous when it is enlisted in an
attempt to "prove" planning by evidence. Naturally, almost anything
is or may be relevant when the subject is planning. In an FCC, CAB
or FPC case, many different criteria are utilized by the agency in
reaching a decision. The parties have no way of knowing in ad-
vance which criteria will be stressed in a given case and for all
that the parties know, new criteria may be introduced. Accord-
ingly, the prudent lawyer must seek to introduce evidence bearing
on every imaginable issue that the agency might consider. The
lawyer would be rash indeed if he omitted some point, no matter
how farfetched, for the agency might later fix upon this as the
pivot of its choice. For the same reason the hearing examiner is
reluctant to exclude any evidence. It is unlikely that he can be
criticized or reversed for admitting evidence, but if he leaves a gap
in the record over the objections of a party he invites trouble. Every-
thing conspires to expand the size of the record and virtually no
counter-force is at work to limit evidence. This condition seems in-
evitable if the decision cannot really be placed upon a basis of objective
choice. Since it is tacitly recognized that the agency will be making
policy as it goes along there can be no limit to the relevance of evi-
dence. It is the limitless and unfenced range of the agency's probable
basis of decision that lies at the root of the procedure problem.
A closely related source of trouble is that because agencies are always
engaged in policy making, there is necessarily confusion about the
line betveen rule making and adjudication. If the agency determines
policy in a rule-making proceeding and this settles the issue at stake
in a particular adjudication, the complaint is, of course, that the
parties to the case were deprived of the substance of their adjudica-
tory hearing because the controlling issue has already been decided.
If, for example, the agency has previously adopted the policy that no
newspaper shall receive a television station, then a subsequent adju-
dicatory hearing on a newspaper's application will be a rather un-
satisfactory affair. On the other hand, if the agency makes policy in
the course of adjudicating a particular case, the opposite protest is
made. If the agency says in its decision on a newspaper's application
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for a television license that beginning with this case no newspaper will
receive a license, the inevitable protest is that there was no adquate
notice of the agency's new rule. This dilemma is a revealing one. It
demonstrates anew that so-called adjudication is actually a combina-
tion of policy making and objective choice, and the trouble with
agency adjudication procedure is that it is designed to fit a model
which does not exist.
Attempts to "prove" planning by evidence lead to another con-
tradiction: the administrative agency's knowledge of facts outside
the record. Administrators are "experts"; they decide many similar
cases and they presumably come from backgrounds which make them
specialists; all of this produces a special knowledge in addition to the
record. It also produces a distinct point of view. If we think in terms
of the judicial model, the agency is open to serious criticism, for its
decisions may be based upon facts outside the record, or opinions
settled in advance of the hearing. But is this not exactly what is meant
by expertise? Is not "expertise" merely another term for knowledge
of facts outside the record plus built-in predispositions? Is not the
administrator who is free of such contamination also free of any claim
to be an expert? When Congress decided that it wanted an expert
tribunal, it is fair to say that Congress also wanted what might be
termed a tilted tribunal--one with a particular approach to the sub-
ject-a viewpoint on policy and on the facts which go into the
formation of policy. Such a tilt was noted in the early days of
regulatory agencies like the NLRB, but in that agency the tilt has
gradually righted itself. But the tilt is inherent when planning is part
of the adjudicatory process. It is policy making which gives the
agency its tilt and thereby distorts the purely judicial model.
All of these intractable difficulties combine to explain the best
known problem of administrative procedure: the endless time in-
volved. The hearings drag on and on, with almost every conceivable
type of evidence admitted, until a vast record has been built up. Some-
times the record will run to thousands of pages. A comparative hear-
ing in a television case might last for one hundred hearing days. In
addition, there are all sorts of procedural delays, so that a case may
take months or years to reach a conclusion. Despite this overwhelming
length, few participants feel that the adjudicatory process is "fair."
The agency comes to its decision with built-in biases and a knowledge
of facts outside the record, which give the parties the uncomfortable
feeling that the decision may have been prejudged. Moreover, it is
often felt that the ultimate decision is not based either on the evi-
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dence put in the record or even on the reasons given in the agency's
opinion. An impression of futility surrounds adjudications, as if the
parties were going through an empty ritual which has no appreciable
impact on the outcome. This does not imply bad faith or corruption;
it simply means that a decision may ultimately be made on political
or policy grounds that are unstated.
The tale of procedure ends with judicial review. The courts know
that something is wrong, but what are they to do? They can order
some more procedure or require an agency to give new or different
reasons but how can they review the substance of a planning or alloca-
tion decision? Yet review may be imperative, for private rights are
often at stake. The intermingling of policy with objective choice is
what gives judicial review of agency adjudications its inconsistent and
sometimes despairing quality. It should be added that the procedure
by which different agency jurisdictions are reconciled or accommo-
dated under the judicial doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a further
source of frustration. The application of the doctrine from case to
case has been drastically inconsistent, and it has mainly served as the
source of great, seemingly endless delay. Parties are dragged through
a lengthy agency proceeding in what may turn out to be a futile quest
for relief they can only obtain elsewhere. Ultimately, the decision by
the tribunal to which the matter has been referred may be based upon
criteria which could easily have been utilized by the original tribunal.
Once again, the fact that the policy-making aspects of the issue are
hidden confounds agency, court and parties alike.
G. The Larger Losses
In some planned societies, there is no written constitution, and no
tradition of pluralism. Planning is then easier, for it need not attempt
to comply with these exacting ideals. But in a society that wants to
have planning and also wants to preserve these ideals, the task is
difficult. Many commentators have argued that planning cannot be
compatible with our constitutional system: planning cannot be
democratic, it cannot be subject to the rule of law, and it cannot
proceed under the principle of equality. A different but equally crucial
question is whether planning is capable of replacing the system of indi-
vidual value choices associated with a free society.
The most obvious strain is in the working of the democratic process.
As was noted earlier, the growth of administrative agencies testifies
that our elected officials are less and less able to keep watch over the
government's activities; they can oversee an ever smaller percentage
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of a larger and larger quantity of decisions. Hence the delegation to
the agencies. The vital question, then, is to what extent the public
itself can participate in, or even be aware of, the agency decision
process.
The problem of public participation begins with the question of
notice. There is rarely any effective notice of governmental decisions
in which the public, or some segment of the public, might be in-
terested. Every day decisions are made concerning highways, dams,
air safety, navigation, and hundreds of other issues. Few are reported
in even the most complete newspaper. Even if there were adequate
notice, the public usually lacks enough information to evaluate the
kinds of decisions that planners make. The question of which route
is best for a highway or how many daily flights shall occur between
New York and Buffalo is a question which combines facts available
to everyone with detailed technical information which the public does
not have. Lacking the latter information, how can the public have
views that are entitled to be given weight? Beyond this, the public
lacks the means of getting heard. Often the citizen will not be able
to find out who the decision maker is. Even if that information is
available, it is not practical for the citizen to seek personal interviews
with planning officials. Yet individuals have little access to the media
of mass communication which might command the attention of
planners. And they must compete with large organizations which can
amplify their voices. Beyond this, even if the individual were fully
able to communicate his views, he would simply be too busy to express
himself on all of the issues with which he had legitimate concern.
He cannot make effective use of his freedom to speak on every issue
no matter how open are the channels of communication. For all of
these reasons, it is hard for the voter, when he goes to the polls, to
vote in a way that is meaningful with respect to a particular issue of
planning or allocation, and it is even harder for him to get heard
directly.
A more abstract but equally critical problem is presented by the
constitutional ideals of limited government and the rule of law. Our
constitutional plan is based upon fear of concentrated power. Hence
the division of power between nation and states, the doctrine of
enumerated and limited powers, the system of checks and balances,
and the Bill of Rights. But where are these to be found in a planned
society? The existence of a planned economy tends to undermine these
concepts. Can there be effective separation of powers when govern-
ment engages in planning? Since Congress does not really set standards
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and the courts do not really review, all power is necessarily concen-
trated in the planning and allocation agencies. And the agencies are
not only free of the separation of powers; they are also free of tradi-
tional limitations upon the areas of legitimate governmental concern.
In planning and allocation the agency may with some logic take
almost any factor (no matter how local or personal) into consideration
in making its decision; the enumerated powers of the constitution are
turned into a general welfare clause that can readily penetrate into
the private lives of citizens. This is especially serious because in plan-
ning and allocation the interests of the community are in the fore-
front of the planner's consciousness, and hence the factors of in-
dividual liberty and privacy tend not to be weighed so heavily. Under
the balancing theory, the public interest becomes equivalent to the
majority interest, and this "outweighs" any "individual" interest in
liberty or privacy. Moreover, planning by its very nature is hard
to confine within fixed boundaries, and this runs counter to any con-
cept of the rule of law. Planning means discretion. How shall we ob-
ject to a decision that puts a super-highway through a park? Can there
be a "law" against it? Perhaps. But the trend to a rule of discretion
is unmistakable.
Discretion can be benevolent, but it can also be oppressive. It is
an unfortunate fact that a large portion of the official corruption that
mars American political life occurs in those agencies which engage
in planning and allocation and therefore have discretion to grant or
deny licenses, contracts, franchises, and other favors. In addition,
discretion can readily be used unfairly or arbitrarily, so as to dis-
criminate against some groups or individuals. Scandals involving li-
quor licenses, highway contracts, building codes and farm subsidies
show that the discretion that accompanies planning and allocation is
an almost unbearable temptation to human nature's less admirable
side.
How does planning comport with the third constitutional ideal of
equality? The more comprehensive the system of planning, the more
it is true that every inequality is the responsibility of government,
not a mere fortuity. In the unplanned society, men who are situated
differently can only blame the spin of the wheel or the inscrutable
will of fate. But the more actively government plans, the more it be-
comes responsible for the consequences. And while we can tolerate
many inequalities that are fashioned by the fates, it is far more diffi-
cult to accept inequalities that are the product of some official's
deliberately taken decision in Washington. The award of defense
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contracts can build up one section of the country and abandon an-
other to decay. A farmer whose poverty is due to a series of droughts
may possibly take his condition philosophically; one whose poverty
is due to the government's denial of a subsidy may become bitter and
rebellious.
Beyond questions of causation, how should "equality" be defined
in a society that plans and allocates in the public interest? "Equality"
can, perhaps, be defined within a single system of allocation. All ap-
plicants for a television license or a farm subsidy should feel that they
have been given an equal chance. If only some can be chosen, it is
important that the law be so designed as to make sure that the choice
was a "fair" one. The less objective the criteria of choice, the more
difficult it is to maintain this feeling. A much more profound problem
is to define equality between allocation systems. One man farms,
another man is an artist, a third drives a taxi and a fourth works in a
shipyard. The farmer is subsidized and protected against ruinous
competition, the shipyard worker is also subsidized and protected, the
taxi driver may or may not get protection against too much competi-
tion but is not subsidized, and the artist gets neither help nor protection
from the government. Should any standard of "equality" be operative
here? Is the artist less useful to the country than the farmer? Is the
artist differently situated on some grand scale of relative circum-
stances? Equality before the law in this sense is a profoundly elusive
idea; perhaps there is no justification for such a concept at all. Perhaps
in an affluent society the issue is to seek a minimum level of well-being
for everyone, beyond which the concept of equality will be of dimin-
ishing importance. But as long as poverty is a serious problem, and as
long as some agencies tend to be sensitive to a few large private
interests, equality will remain a vital issue.
I do not mean by the preceding discussion to suggest that there
can ever be any resolution of the great problems of democracy, the
rule of law, and equality. My point is to show these issues boiling
beneath the surface of our administrative law and likely to surge up
dangerously when a nation which expects its government to be
responsive, limited, and fair discovers, in a flood of political aware-
ness, that these expectations are becoming less real just as government
intrudes more and more into the lives of citizens and hence into their
consciousness.
Beyond all questions raised by legal ideals is a further question: can
the planning process be trusted to act as a chooser of values? The
choice of values is the heart of the planning process. Regulatory law,
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no matter how radical, proceeds upon the theory that its function is
to be a traffic officer; it takes things as it finds them, and merely at-
tempts to regulate the traffic. Thus the first zoning laws primarily
tried to keep the different uses of land from interfering with each
other, much as a traffic light keeps two streams of traffic separate. Plan-
ning begins when the law asks what should be; it is here that the
ability of planning to choose values becomes a crucial issue. The short-
comings of administrative law previously mentioned in this article
do not inspire confidence in the ability of a typical agency to act
as a value chooser. The balancing theory of the public interest, as
previously noted, makes the agency unduly responsive to immediate
pressures and private interests. On the other hand, the agency lacks
enough democratic participation by the community as a whole to
know the community's wishes. As a substitute for ability to reflect all
of the interests in the community, the agency cultivates a form of
professionalism in which it attempts to "know what is best" for the
community. The trouble is that professionals have their own peculiar
narrowness of outlook. Like all experts they are likely to adopt a par-
ticular point of view and then to pursue it without rethinking the
problem from time to time. The Bureau of Reclamation is a dam-
building machine which will keep building dams as long as there is
running water in a stream in the United States. At the same time, it
lacks a broader outlook which might consider the values that dams
destroy. Professionals, in short, can be counted on to do their job but
not necessarily to define their job.
The more basic problem of value choosing is whether expertise
can ever substitute for individual choices. In an unplanned society
we have a multiple sovereignty of private property and every owner
engages in value choosing. Planning is based upon the theory that
such multiple choosing becomes impractical in a crowded world.
Therefore government must make some choices that will govern us
all. We are invited to look ahead to a scientific society in which
values will be chosen on a rational basis. Unfortunately, science is
not yet able to encompass the many different values that human beings
choose if left to their own individual idiosyncrasies. As yet, science
knows very little about what makes people happy or what adds to
the richness and satisfaction of life.
III. THE SEARCH FOR NEW SOLUTIONS
Administrative law is in a state of rapid change. Looking at these
changes, it is possible to pick out some which seem highly relevant
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to the problems just discussed. They are not only relevant, they are
extremely helpful in thinking about how to approach a new law of
planning. Of course one cannot pick out isolated decisions and call
them a trend. But the law represents a source of new ideas. It can offer
a pragmatic approach which helps to point out the direction in which
the theory of the law must go.
A. Broader Definition of Task
One development has been toward a more inclusive definition of
the goals or values which an agency must consider. This is to be care-
fully distinguished from efforts to fix more definite standards for
agency decision making. Such efforts, doomed to failure, seek to nar-
row an agency's range of choice. A broader definition, in contrast,
does not guide the agency to a decision, but attempts to liberate its
thinking. It is simply the enlarging of the factors or values which
an agency must take into consideration. For example, regulations
adopted by the Bureau of Public Roads for the Interstate Highway
System provide, 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(c):
... The conservation and development of natural resources, the
advancement of economic and social values, and the promotion
of desirable land utilization, as well as the existing and potential
highway traffic and other pertinent criteria are to be considered
when selecting highways to be added to a Federal-aid system or
when proposing revisions of a previously approved Federal-aid
system.
Probably the most significant development of this type has been the
case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Consolidated Edison
proposed to build a power facility at Storm King Mountain on the
Hudson River at a point of historical and scenic importance. The
project was not a use of hydroelectric power from the river, but a
"storage battery" intended to pump water into a reservoir using the
off-hour capacity of New York City's generators to store up water
power for times of peak demand. New high tension wires were re-
quired by the proposal. Conservationists and local communities pro-
tested the project, arguing that it would damage the river scenery and
the beauty of local communities, and that alternative ways could be
found to store up power. The Federal Power Commission overruled
these objections and approved the proposal. Its reasoning proceeded
along traditional lines of economic emphasis and balancing of in-
terests. The Commission found:
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The primary benefit which will be realized from the proposed
project is its economy and reliability as a source of power to meet
Con Edison's peaking and emergency requirements. The undis-
puted proof shows that the Cornwall project would produce
savings in the cost of electricity of over $12 million each year as
compared with a modem steam electric plant, the only practical
alternative source suggested.
On the basis of this finding the Commission's conclusion was as fol-
lows:
We have considered with sympathy the protests, which in
substance say there must be another source of power as good or
better. The record shows, however, that the Cornwall project
has large advantages over any other method of meeting the ap-
plicant's need for additional peaking power .... Here the impact
of the project on the surrounding area is minimal while the need
for electricity from this economical and dependable source is
great.
We therefore conclude that on balance the issuance of a license
appropriately conditioned to avoid unnecessary harm to the land-
scape or to other public or private interests, for the construction,
operation, and maintenance by Con Edison of the Cornwall
project, is desirable and justified in the overall public interest
and that such license should be granted.
The Court of Appeals, in a landmark decision, returned the case
to the Commission for a new hearing. The court told the Commission
that:
If the Commission is properly to discharge its duty in this
regard, the record on which it bases its determination must be
complete. The petitioners and the public at large have a right to
demand this completeness. It is our view, and we find, that the
Commission has failed to compile a record which is sufficient to
support its decision. The Commission has ignored certain relevant
factors and failed to make a thorough study of possible altema-
tives to the Storm King project. While the courts have no authority
to concern themselves with the policies of the Commission, it is
their duty to see to it that the Commission's decisions receive that
careful consideration which the statute contemplates. . ..
This is the essence of the court's holding. But the opinion goes further.
The full reach of the decision may be suggested by the following
comments.
First. Historically, the chief concern of the Federal Power Commis-
sion was the development and promotion of hydroelectric power,
and its usual approach was to deal with proposed projects on a case-to-
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case basis. Here, for example, the Commission did not attempt a
study of the possibilities of the Hudson River Valley as a whole; it
focused on the proposal immediately before it. The Court of Appeals,
however, instructed the Commission to undertake a broad and com-
prehensive responsibility for planning. In the words of the court:
"Congress gave the Federal Power Commission sweeping authority and
a specific planning responsibility." Under the Second Circuit decision,
the Commission is now not entitled to approve this project without
first reviewing plans for the entire region to make certain that the
project fits into a comprehensive picture of the region's development.
Second. As already noted, the Federal Power Commission and other
federal agencies have usually been willing to sit back and allow inter-
ested parties before them to bring forth the considerations, facts, and
arguments which might bear on or define the public interest. The
Commission, acting somewhat like a court, could then proceed to
weigh the "evidence" before it, and decide between the competing
claims. The Court of Appeals rejected this passive concept of the FPC's
role. Instead, the court told the Commission that it must undertake
an affirmative burden of inquiry:
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to
be the representative of the public interest. This role does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes
for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must
receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Com-
mission.
Third. The federal regulatory process has suffered not only from a
bias toward specific developments like hydroelectric projects, but also
from a tendency to weight economic and pecuniary values more heavily
than intangible values. The Court of Appeals insisted that the Com-
mission reconsider its scale of values. The Commission was obviously
impressed with an annual saving of $12,000,000 promised by Con-
solidated Edison. But the court said: "We find no indication that
the Commission seriously weighed the aesthetic advantages of under-
ground transmission lines against the economic disadvantages." And
the Court concluded:
The Commission's renewed proceedings must include as a basic
concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national his-
toric shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the
cost of a project is only one of several factors to be considered.
The court did not indicate the weight to be given to beauty but it
did place beauty and other intangible interests in a far less disadvan-
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tageous position for the future. The court also placed more weight
than the Commission on such values as recreation and the survival
of fish in the river. These values, which might be termed partly
economic and partly recreational, had previously been subordinated
to the Commission's concern with electric power.
Fourth. As part of its passive attitude the Federal Power Commis-
sion, along with other regulatory agencies, had usually rejected or ac-
cepted proposals without seriously exploring alternatives. The Court of
Appeals told the Commission to give serious consideration to alterna-
tives and to see whether in view of all the other values at stake some
other method of producing electric power might in the long run
be preferable:
The Commission neither investigated the use of interconnected
power as a possible alternative to the Storm King project, nor
required Consolidated Edison to supply such information ...
The failure of the Commission to inform itself of these alterna-
tives cannot be reconciled with its planning responsibility under
the Federal Power Act.
Of course a "checklist" of values cannot be a guarantee of well-con-
sidered decision making. The CAB has been given a checklist of values,
and its decisions are hardly a model of the planning process. But if
we cannot guarantee "right" decisions, we can perhaps insure that
more decisions are made by the right processes, and the Second Circuit's
opinion suggests one way that this might be done.
B. The Right to Participate in Agency Proceedings
Another development is concerned with the right to participate in
agency proceedings. From narrow beginnings, more appropriate to
adjudication and regulation than to planning, this right has grown
quietly but steadily. Some of the cases directly involve the right to
participate, while others involve the right to obtain judicial review.
The law centers on the concept of the would-be participant's "interest."
"Interest" means something which distinguishes a proposed party from
the general public, for agencies and courts share a pervasive fear that
proceedings will be inundated by too many participants. The defini-
tion of "interest" began with accepted legal categories: an interested
party was one whose legal rights might be affected by the outcome, or
one who had a substantial economic stake in the outcome.
Gradually the definition expanded. In an FPC proceeding to auio-
rize a natural gas pipeline, the National Coal Association (a trade asso-
ciation of coal producers including some who might lose business
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due to the pipeline), the United Mine Workers, and the Railway
Labor Executives Association were held to be interested parties on
the theory that each might suffer economically through the proposed
competition. In a case involving the proposed abandonment of a
natural gas pipeline, the City of Pittsburgh was held to be interested
because of the possible danger to the future supply of gas for its resi-
dents. On the other hand, tenants who would be displaced by an urban
renewal project and who claimed they would have no adequate place
to live have been denied the right to sue; such persons do, however,
have the statutory right to appear at a public advisory hearing. In an
unusual case where the Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park
undertook a program of slaughtering elk, professional guides who made
their living by conducting hunting parties in Yellowstone tried to sue,
but lost out on the ground of sovereign immunity. In a still more
unusual case citizens of the United States, together with alien residents
of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific, attempted to enjoin the testing
of atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands, alleging genetic injury to
the world's population and immediate danger to health. They were
held to lack standing to sue, having no special interest apart from
that of mankind in general.
It is in this context of decisions insisting upon some form of "special"
interest that the opinion in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC takes on an additional significance. The FPC's order approving
the facility was challenged by the Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference, an unincorporated association consisting of several non-profit
organizations concerned with natural beauty and conservation, and
three towns. Their standing was questioned. The court said:
The Federal Power Act seeks to protect noneconomic as well as
economic interests .
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conserva-
tional, and recreational aspects of power development, those who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved"
parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives
petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests. . ..
We see no justification for the Commission's fear that our de-
termination will encourage "literally thousands" to intervene
and seek review in future proceedings .... Our experience with
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public actions confirms the view that the expense and vexation
of legal proceedings is not lightly undertaken....
... [T]he Commission has ample authority reasonably to limit
those eligible to intervene or to seek review.... Representation
of common interests by an organization such as Scenic Hudson
serves to limit the number of those who might otherwise apply
for intervention and serves to expedite the administrative process.
This case, while it talks about "special interest," really appears to
proceed on a quite different principle: the need to have certain points
of view represented. This implied principle was made explicit in a
second case of great importance, Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The FCC
granted a license renewal to a television station in Jackson, Mississippi,
despite complaints that the station had engaged in racial discrimina-
tion. Court review was sought by United Church of Christ, a national
denomination with substantial membership in the station's prime lis-
tening area, and by two individuals who were described as both owners
of television sets and civil rights leaders. They claimed standing on
the ground (1) that they were denied equal time on their air to answer
their critics, (2) that they represented nearly one-half of the station's
potential listening audience, a group who were allegedly discriminated
against and ignored, and (3) that they represented the total listening
audience with respect to the right of all listeners to hear balanced pro-
gramming. The Commission denied the petitions to intervene, promis-
ing however, that it would consider the issues raised by their com-
plaints. The Commission took the position that members of the
listening public do not suffer any injury peculiar to them, and that
to give them standing would pose great administrative burdens.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
in an opinion that undertook a sweeping reexamination of the doc-
trine of standing. The court began by observing that concepts of
standing have not been static, and standing is not limited to those
suffering economic injury. Standing, said the court, is accorded to
persons "not for the protection of their private interest but only to
vindicate the public interest." Calling the concept of standing "prac-
tical and functional," the court said it could see no reason to exclude
the listening audience. On the contrary, participation by the listening
audience "seems essential to insure that the holders of broadcasting
licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience. . . ." Moreover,
the court continued, the fact that the FCC itself is directed by Con-
gress to protect the public interest is no reason "to preclude the
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listening public from assisting in that task." The court noted that
the FCC's duties are vast and it cannot monitor every broadcast. And
the Commission has always viewed its regulatory duties "as guided if
not limited by our national tradition that public response is the most
reliable test of ideas and performance in broadcasting as in most areas
of life." As for the theory that the FCC itself can represent listener
interests, the court said:
When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer
a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely
on it. The gradual expansion and evolution of concepts of stand-
ing in administrative law attests that experience rather than logic
or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide.
The court added that expedients such as permitting the public to
write letters of complaint or appear as witnesses at local hearings
were not sufficient; the beneficial contribution of listeners "must not
be left to the grace of the Commission."
The court then set forth a theory of representation for the agency's
"consumers" or constituents. Unless they can be heard, it said, there
may be no one to bring unsatisfactory programming to the FCC's at-
tention: "Some mechanism must be developed so that the legitimate
interests of listeners can be made a part of the record which the Com-
mission evaluates." Experience demonstrates, the court said, that
"consumers are generally among the best vindicators of the public
interest."
In order to safeguard the public interest in broadcasting, there-
fore, we hold that some "audience participation" must be allowed
in license renewal proceedings.
The court then suggested the kind of groups or organizations that
might properly represent the public:
The responsible and representative groups eligible to intervene
cannot here be enumerated or categorized specifically; such com-
munity organizations as civic associations, professional societies,
unions, churches, and educational institutions or associations
might well be helpful to the Commission. These groups are found
in every community; they usually concern themselves with a wide
range of community problems and tend to be representatives of
broad as distinguished from narrow interests, public as distin-
guished from private or commercial interests.
The Commission should be accorded broad discretion in es-
tablishing and applying rules for such public participation, in-
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cluding rules for determining which community representatives
are to be allowed to participate and how many are reasonably re-
quired to give the Commission the assistance it needs in vindi-
cating the public interest.
Were this decision to be followed with respect to other agencies, it
would revolutionize the present law of participation in administrative
proceedings. It is too soon to know its effect. But meanwhile there are
other straws in the wind.
C. Advisory Hearings
A number of agencies have not waited for the law of standing to
develop a measure of democratic participation. Either by regulation
or -statute, they have provided for advisory hearings-hearings that
are not binding on the agency, but have the virtue of being open to
all-much like a town meeting, held before a particular agency on a
particular issue. The Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1964),
provides as follows:
Any State highway department which submits plans for a Fed-
eral-aid highway project involving the bypassing of, or going
through, any city, town, or village, either incorporated or un-
incorporated, shall certify to the Secretary that it has had public
hearings, or has afforded the opportunity for such hearings, and
has considered the economic effects of such a location. Any State
highway department which submits plans for an Interstate System
project shall certify to the Secretary that it has had public hear-
ings at a convenient location, or has afforded the opportunity for
such hearings, for the purpose of enabling persons in rural areas
through or contiguous to whose property the highway will pass
to express any objections they may have to the proposed location
of such highway.
The hearings contemplated by the Highway Act are not like either
the judicial model or the model of the legislative hearing as developed
by Congress. There are, on the one hand, no requirements concerning
evidence, testimony, cross-examination or the keeping of a record. On
the other hand, the agency is not quite as free to disregard the hear-
ings as a legislature is; the highway department must certify that it
"has considered" at least the economic objections to a particular lo-
cation. Thus it is that these hearings have a town meeting quality or,
in current terms, an element of "participatory democracy."
Another example of advisory hearings by regulation is the Forest
Service's provision for hearings on wilderness classification. When the
Service wishes to promulgate a decision concerning a wilderness area,
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officials must first determine if there is any demand for a hearing. If
so, a town-meeting type hearing is held at or near the location, before
a Department of Agriculture official. At a typical hearing there might
be statements by lumbermen, chamber of commerce officials, conserva-
tionists, scientists, labor unions, and members of the Forest Service
itself. The hearing is part of the total record on the basis of which
the agency ultimately makes up its mind.
There are, of course, major differences between an advisory hearing
and the type of hearing that must be afforded one who has legal
standing. A party with standing may be entitled to notice, to present
evidence, to cross-examine other witnesses, to insist that the decision
be based on the record made at the hearing, and to judicial review.
These are very significant differences. Nevertheless, the advisory hear-
ing deserves notice as a growing phenomenon, obviously designed to
meet a growing need or demand.
D. Self-Government
Recently there have been some efforts to institutionalize commu-
nity participation. In the antipoverty program, the Office of Economic
Opportunity has sought "the participation of the poor" in directing
community programs. Attempts to institutionalize such participation
have taken various forms: community-wide election of representatives,
participation of representatives in local programs, regional and na-
tional conferences, and conventions. Inevitably, the problems are
tremendous: how is the electorate defined, how are leaders nominated
and chosen, how does the electorate inform itself on the issues and
transmit its opinions? Then there are political questions: to what ex-
tent is participation genuinely welcomed, how does such participation
dovetail or collide with existing political power, and what happens
if the participation becomes too well-organized, too powerful, and
too radical? To begin such an experiment with "the poor" has its
special difficulties: "the poor" are by definition the group least able,
by education, experience, and opportunity, to take part in a new ex-
periment in government. I cannot discuss the OEO experiment here,
but it is a significant part of the total picture of efforts toward demo-
cratic participation.
E. Direct Action
To the three forms of participation just mentioned we should add
a fourth: the type of action described in the introduction to this ar-
ticle. More and more often, it seems, people will not wait for the
liberalization of the law of standing or the creation of advisory hear-
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ing procedure; they resort to direct action. When a highway was pro-
posed for the old canal towpath bordering the Potomac River, Mr.
Justice William 0. Douglas led a 189-mile protest hike to call attention
to the recreational value of the towpath. The hike succeeded in getting
the highway reconsidered. In 1954, when the hike took place, such
demonstrations were unusual, even though protest demonstrations
have always enjoyed a certain popularity (e.g., the Boston Tea Party).
In the short space of a dozen years, demonstrations have become
commonplace. Direct action is often combined with political and
legislative efforts. When it was proposed to process and dispose of ra-
dioactive waste materials in the City of New Britain, a matter within
the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission, townspeople
passed ordinances forbidding the waste processing, protested at AEC
hearings, engaged in a public relations campaign, and took the matter
to court, all almost simultaneously.
One of the best examples of direct action I have seen is the Save
the Park Campaign in New Haven. An interstate highway connector
was about to be constructed through East Rock Park. Residents
launched a campaign that included nearly every imaginable strategy:
a citizens' organization, meetings, hearings, newspaper publicity,
bumper stickers, Save the Park Days, local ordinances, new state legis-
lation, and court action. At this writing the Park forces seem to have
roundly defeated the highway department.
Direct action continues to be a constant newspaper story; it is a
rare day when the New York Times does not carry at least one in-
stance. Very recently it was reported that a group in Redwood City,
California, was protesting a decision by the city's Board of Port
Commissioners to allow the manufacture of napalm in the city to be
used in the Vietnam War; objectors declared that "Redwood City
will become known as a place where flaming death is manufactured."
They were reported to have 2,600 signatures on petitions--enough
to force a referendum on the decision of the Board. Thus public con-
cern with planning stretches from old houses to war, and each effort
confronts the common problem of control over planning decisions.
But although there has been some success in getting results, piecemeal
efforts are not likely to create a system of law. And in the end, only
a system of law can control the planned society.
IV. AN APPROACH TO A LAW OF PLANNING
In what direction do the developments in administrative law point?
Viewed as experiments, they are clues to a law of planning. They sug-
gest that such law may at a minimum do something to cope with the
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problems of democratic participation. They also offer some guidelines
to the problem of choosing values and the problem of equality. And
possibly they hint at steps the law can take to impose a form of limita-
tion upon the whole planning process, leaving an area beyond for
the individual. The discussion below considers these suggestions-in
a way that must necessarily be tentative.
A. Democratic Participation
Any system of law intended to secure greater public participation
in the process of planning and allocation must begin with the problem
of notice. Unless there is some way that interested persons can find
out about proposals before they are adopted, intervention will usually
come too late. The problem of notice is not solved by an obscure
reference in the Federal Register. Even the most alert citizen would
find himself swamped by the deluge of announcements. And if he did
find something he was interested in, he would not know what the
particular issues were. There are at least two possible answers to
the deluge problem. First, to some extent it is possible to count on
specialized organizations-air passengers' associations and historic
homes associations, for example-to be the watchdogs of the Federal
Register. Many such organizations now exist and do keep watch; more
watchdogs will come into being as the need arises. In addition, agen-
cies might give special notice to interested organizations, and to any-
one else who made a written request. Agencies might also be required
to adopt master plans, and to give notice of these plans, in addition
to notice of individual actions. The FPC could be required to formu-
late and make public its tentative plan for a whole river basin; the
CAB could be asked for a regional transportation plan. This would
consolidate the number of notices, and at the same time encourage
longer-range planning, with the incidental benefit of more time for
discussion. To focus debate, a master plan might be offered with al-
ternatives, putting clear-cut choices before the public.
Assuming that the law could cope with the question of notice, the
next problem would be the mechanics of participation. The easiest
form of participation is by written statements, and this should always
be possible. But, generally speaking, hearings of some sort are needed
too. The advisory hearing seems a useful device. An advisory hearing
before an agency requires certain procedural safeguards if it is to do its
job properly. The hearing should be held before disinterested persons
who did not initiate the original proposal. Agencies should be com-
pelled to respond to hearings at least to the extent of giving reasons for
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decisions. This might force the agency to give thought to adverse
views. In addition, there should be some opportunity for public par-
ticipation or argument in the review of initial decisions made after
hearings, so that at the stage of final review, the agency would have
before it advocates of alternative positions. Such procedures could
make the advisory hearing process an integral part of the decision
process. In every case of planning the appropriateness of a hearing and
the kind of hearing might be judged according to flexible standards.
While these proposals are essentially pragmatic, they raise questions
concerning some rather basic matters of theory. The first theoretical
issue goes to the question of democratic structures: the nature of legis-
latures designed for planning and the nature of their constituencies.
Our administrative agencies suggest a concept of a new multi-legisla-
tive democracy, in which Congress would perform only certain general
functions of arbitration and oversight, and the remainder of its work
would be carried out by many different specialized legislatures. This is
not necessarily at war with the original constitutional scheme of things.
The original scheme contemplated many local legislatures. Because
many interests no longer divide along regional lines, these local legisla-
tures can no longer deal with some of the most important public issues.
Interests still divide up, however, but the division instead of being
regional is functional-and hence our administrative agencies might
be thought of as the local, specialized legislatures of today.
If the agencies are to be our new legislatures, we may also speculate
about a new type of constituency. This is already with us, as the po-
litical scientists point out, in the form of large organized interests:
corporations, industry trade associations, labor unions, organizations
representing groups like the farmers or automobile owners and in-
terest groups such as the fishermen's or riflemen's associations. Aknd
over the years most of the planning and allocating agencies have
tended to develop their own constituencies. Some of the constituents
have been in effect customers or partners, as the airline industry is
to the CAB. Others have been watchdogs and critics as the Sierra Club
is to the Forest Service. Such constituents already take a day-to-day
interest in the activities of "their" agencies. They have the resources
of specialized help to obtain sufficient information fully to under-
stand and evaluate the agency decision, and they have an easier time
getting heard because they know who is in charge and they are big
enough to force him to pay attention. They invite a concept of
democracy based not on locality or geography but rather a democracy
of mutual interests. But they raise many questions. Are these or-
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ganizations themselves internally democratic? Do they collectively
represent all the voices in society, or only the most powerful and
articulate? Is a division by mutual interests likely in the long run to
be profoundly divisive? Certainly interest groups cannot be the ex-
clusive method of democracy. But if we take as an axiom that wherever
planning decisions are made, representation is needed, then there
must be a forum for telephone users (to debate digit dialing) and for
other categories into which our lives are divided; the form of gov-
ernment must follow the substance.
Should these organizations be given an institutional role in the
planning process? Such a role might take several forms. Specialized
groups might be afforded direct notice of proposed agency action and
be admitted as of right to hearings. The Forest Service has worked out
a more structured role for interest groups by setting up advisory coun-
cils at which different industry and interest group representatives are
invited to join in a council which is used as a sounding board and
source of ideas for the agency. These advisory groups do not have
formal authority and one difficulty is that the Forest Service chooses
the council, which may be more of a "company union" than an in-
dependent force. Nevertheless it does provide a regular channel for
interest groups which already exist.
A further theoretical issue raised by the problem of democratic par-
ticipation concerns the concept of free speech in a planned society.
Constitutional protection of speech has centered on content-the
right to express ideas which others find objectionable. But today a
greater problem of free expression is not the content of speech but
whether speech can be made audible-whether speech can be effective.
To be effective, speech must reach other citizens (this is increasingly
a problem of mass communications) and must also reach government.
The problem of speech that is most sharply presented by a planned
society is getting heard by government.
What are the means for reaching government from the outside?
Perhaps the most obvious is through "political influence"-the kind
of power that large economic interests, organizations and pressure
groups are able to exert. A second route is through the use of televi-
sion, radio, the newspapers or magazines-a route available only to
a few well situated persons or groups. A third route is by legal pro-
ceedings before the agencies and the courts. In criticizing administra-
tive law, we should not overlook the fact that one of the underlying
functions of legal proceedings against the government is not to "win"
in the old-fashioned sense of winning a lawsuit, but to force the gov-
(Vol. 75:12271260
PLANNED SOCIETY
eminent to pay attention to a particular point of view. This is per-
haps the primary value of litigation challenging the licensing of
atomic waste disposal in New Britain, or the building of a dam in
Hell's Canyon. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that certain forms
of litigation must be protected as free speech under the Constitution.
But legal proceedings, like political influence and mass communica-
tions, are open only to a very few. The problem, then, is to create a
channel of communication by which the ordinary citizen can reach
his government. It is this that we have been dealing with in dis-
cussing the problems of notice, advisory hearings, and constituencies.
These methods, or others like them, must strive to create a constitu-
tional right of effective speech in the planned society.
B. Broadening the Values in Planning
The Scenic Hudson case suggests that Congress, while it cannot fix
more definite standards for agency decisions, can insist upon broader
standards: a more sweeping definition of the agency's task and a wider
list of the values that must be considered. Is this a workable remedy
for the narrowness of some agencies' vision? Perhaps it would help
to think of the delegation of power to any agency in terms of a
corporate or an institutional charter, conferring the general govern-
ment and management of a given area, just as the Corporation of
Yale University is given, not an instruction to make rules in "the
public interest," but the "government, care, and management" of the
University. This should make clear to an agency that its responsibility
cannot be satisfied by passive balancing of competing interests, but
that it must engage in affirmative planning on its own. The charter
of the Forest Service furnishes an example. It states that "[T]he Secre-
tary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to develop and ad-
minister the renewable surface resources of national forests...." Such
a statutory mandate is, of course, easier to lay down where the subject
matter is publicly owned. But could we not also tell the CAB that
its responsibility is to administer the public air corridors of the nation
and to plan, promote and regulate the national air transportation
system? The FPC could be chartered as an agency to care for and
manage the nation's hydroelectric resources. Thus the law could es-
tablish each agency as a public enterprise like the post office or the
TVA-operated in part by private enterprise but with the public
agency responsible to the consumers for the ultimate product. Such
a delegation would not only remind the agency of the scope of its
responsibilities, it would make clear to the public where responsibility
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for failure lies. If television programs are objectionable, the public
should be able to hold the FCC accountable, and if airline service is
unsatisfactory the CAB should be an object of criticism. The public
will, of course, continue to blame the private entrepreneurs as well,
but the law can help the public to perceive and locate governmental
responsibility.
Besides delegating power, Congress might also attempt to set down
a checklist of certain basic goals or values that the agency must take
into consideration. The charter of the Forest Service, 16 U.S.C. § 531(a)
(1964), once again offers a model. The Secretary of Agriculture is told
to administer the forest resources for "multiple use." This term is
defined as management of forest resources
... so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet
the needs of the American people; making the most judicious
use of the land for some or all of these resources or related services
over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic
adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions;
that some land will be used for less than all of the resources; and
harmonious and coordinated management of the various re-
sources; each with the other, without impairment of the produc-
tivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative
values of the various resources, and not necessarily the combina-
tion of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest
unit output.
In the case of each planning agency Congress could take special pains
to define those values which might seem outside the immediate scope
of the agency's main concern. For example, the FPC could be told to
concern itself with scenery, recreation, historic and archaeological
values as well as the production of hydroelectric power. Congress
might thus seek to guard human values that might otherwise be ig-
nored. Such statements of values are no mere gesture. Experience
with the Forest Service demonstrates that if a professional agency is
developed and given full responsibility, it is of the nature of bureauc-
racy that it will take very seriously whatever guides Congress imposes.
The Forest Service has its limitations of vision, but it does try to
carry out its mandate faithfully. It demonstrates how well an agency
can function if its basic responsibility for planning and management
(with certain defined goals and values) is made clear to it and to
the public.
A broader outlook can also be built into the agency itself by institu-
tionalizing certain values which might otherwise be neglected. Why
not a bureau of conservation in the highway department, a depart-
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ment of fisheries for the FP0, a division of educational television in
the FCC? Such agencies or bureaus could be depended on to do what
comes naturally to any bureau: pursue its own raison d'etre as ar-
dently as possible. The device of bureaus to represent interests is
already common in government, like the Disarmament Agency which
is supposed to counteract the Pentagon. It is no longer a surprising
thought that government must take measures to ensure a broad range
of values and even to promote its own opposition. As government
grows ever stronger, it must underwrite pluralism in ever more ex-
plicit terms.
An agency can only support a full spectrum of values if it has some
way to identify all of them. This exposes a further duty of the plan-
ning agency-not merely to represent all visible values, but to seek
out those which are not so readily discovered. Suppose the issue is
whether to build a dam. Certain interests are immediately apparent-
navigation, consumption of electricity, recreation. But a search might
disclose many other interests at stake. What is the impact of a dam
on the natural environment-on wildlife and erosion? What is its
impact on one region of the United States as against another? On
agriculture in the region of the dam and in competing regions? These
are questions for research and for science. Often only government
will have the resources to carry out such investigations; there may
be no articulate representatives of some of these invisible issues (just
as our highway builders have had little knowledge of the social effects
of the multitudes of automobiles they set rolling). The theorists of
planning assume such scientific investigation. It remains for admin-
istrative law to find means of making certain that it takes place.
What has been said so far has been concerned with insuring that
planning agencies take note of as wide as possible a range of values.
Broadening agency charters, institutionalizing and seeking out values,
and permitting constituencies to take part in decision making are all
devices to increase the likelihood that the less immediate and less
vocal values will be heard from. But the reasons why some values are
neglected go much deeper than failure to think about them. The
underlying problem is our failure to fit them into a budget of our
needs.
The hiker who walks the Appalachian Trail in New York State
frequently encounters paved highways. At one point the trail requires
him to cross an extremely busy four-lane highway where cars and
trucks travel at least 60 miles an hour. There is no median strip and
because of dips in the road visibility is cut off in both directions.
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Why is there no footbridge at this dangerous place? Perhaps it was
a failure of planning. The highway builders, intent upon automobile
transportation, simply did not think of the need for a footbridge.
Maybe they did not even know that the Appalachian Trail must cross
the highway. The initial failure may, therefore, have been lack of
knowledge. Had the highway department been properly set up for
planning it might-either on its own or at the prodding of a hikers'
organization-have been aware of the need for a footbridge. It does
not follow from this, however, that the bridge would have been built.
Bridges cost money and the highway department must budget its
funds to produce the maximum in transportation. Does the highway
department have a budget for trails? If there is no footbridge at this
point, it is most likely not merely a failure of planning, but also
because we have not been willing to pay for this particular value.
The plight of the pedestrian everywhere in our country shows the
link between identifying values, giving them recognition and paying
for them-three closely interrelated aspects of the planning process.
Let the pedestrian try to walk along the street in the sidewalkless
suburbs, or promenade along a riverbank that has been preempted by
railroad yards and highways, or cross a bridge built mainly to carry
vehicular traffic, and he will find himself humiliated and harassed,
if not in actual danger.
The values which are most frequently neglected by planners are
those which cannot be measured in commercial terms and therefore
cannot conveniently be budgeted. In a society in which government
supports and subsidizes so much, it is necessary that the intangible
values be supported too. If we want a system of trails for hikers, we
must be prepared not only to recognize this in our planning but to
provide for it in our budgets. In New York City an organization
called the Committee to Beautify the City of New York proposed that
all new buildings be required to budget one per cent of their costs
for aesthetic purposes. The tiny size of even this proposal shows how
inadequate our conception of paying for values has been. If we want
vestpocket parks in our cities, it is not only a question of leaving
some space open in our planning but also of paying for that space
and for its maintenance. Our cities could make good use of the roof-
tops of the houses for recreational space sadly lacking down below-
if we were willing to pay. Along our turnpikes we could have gen-
uinely appealing picnic areas at a distance from the road, spread out
enough to offer some privacy and provided with running water, fire-
places and ample lawns. Accidents on highways due to driver fatigue
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might well be cut down by such rest spots. If our present "rest areas"
are barren oases, gravel strips frighteningly close to rumbling trucks
and bare to a harsh sun, it is because we will not pay for more. This
is a failure of planning in the most profound sense-a failure to develop
methods by which we can recognize the full spectrum of our needs.
C. Equality and Entitlement
What place does the ideal of equality have in a planned society?
Every act of planning redistributes values, intentionally or not, and
much planning is carried on by direct allocation of resources. Maybe
the larger questions of equality-between farmer and urban worker,
between entrepreneurs and scientists--must be left to the philoso-
phers or to the workings of the political system. But recent develop-
ments in administrative law suggest that there are at least twvo kinds
of equality which the law is capable of comprehending. The first,
and narrower, is equality within a single allocation system. The second
is equality in the sense of a minimum share in the commonwealth.
Since I have written on these issues elsewhere, I will be brief here.
The first problem is equality within a single allocation system. The
role of government as an allocator of values is common to socialist
as well as democratic regimes. As government comes to occupy a
central position in the economy, it becomes the dispenser of resources,
occupational licenses, educational privileges, contracts and franchises,
which are a major source of the status and well-being of individuals.
Allocation which meets the needs of planning does not, however,
necessarily measure up to any ideal of equality. Planning focuses on
the needs of the majority and its ends might well be served by what
could be considered unfairness or inequality in a given case. Demands
of fairness, on the other hand, exist regardless of whether they serve
the interests of the people as a whole. If allocation is subject to a rule
of fairness, there can be a basic tension between the planning and
allocating functions of government.
Resolution of this tension might be easy if planning and allocation
could be separated into a two-step process. But very frequently they
are inseparable. When a television licensee is selected, the FCC must
make a planning choice (what type of broadcasting will best serve
the public interest) and at the same time it must allocate a very
substantial asset. Here planning takes place by means of allocation;
allocation represents individual acts of policy making. It seems to
me that we must make an arbitrary choice of whether the planning
or the equality ideal shall prevail when the two conflict. Some re-
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sources should be distributed according to principles of objective
entitlement, available to all who meet a statutory standard. Such re-
sources would take on the status of protected property rights. Where
property is recognized, adjudication and principles of fairness and
equality are appropriate. Other resources should be distributed to
those who will use them in a manner that will best serve certain
policies of the community. Where the private holder is performing
an essentially public function, rights of property and equality should
not be recognized and the planning rather than the adjudicatory
model is appropriate.
The choice of which valuables dispensed by government should
be made subject to principles of objective entitlement has largely
been made by the law already: they are valuables that are closely
identified with the security and independence of individuals. Among
the resources dispensed by government which it would seem desirable
to treat as property are social security pensions, veterans' benefits,
professional and occupational licenses, public assistance, unemploy-
ment compensation, public housing, benefits under the Economic Op-
portunity Act, Medicare, educational benefits and farm subsidies.
Planning with respect to such rights can be done on a general basis;
the rights themselves should be distributed to all who qualify for a
certain status. Governmental decisions concerning such rights should
be and are increasingly subject to the requirements of due process of
law; such rights should not be denied or revoked without a full
adjudicatory hearing.
In contrast, the right to build a dam on a navigable river, to fly
an airline route, or to broadcast over a television channel need not,
and probably cannot, be distributed in accordance with objective
standards. Here the ideal of equality must be abandoned, but the
ideal of public service can be strictly enforced. These values should
not be treated as property and the law should make every effort to
see that they do not become property in the hands of holders. In the
case of a television license, for example, there is no reason why the
law should permit the license, which is handed out free, to be sold
or transferred by the licensee for what is frequently a large sum of
money. It should be no more transferable than a government con-
tract. Such rights would still be very valuable and much sought after
but they would not quite have their present profoundly corrupting
windfall aspect. If the government retained close supervision over
the activities of the holders of these valuables, and also accepted the
ultimate responsibility for the services performed, this would further
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avoid any similarity to private property. If these steps were taken, we
might approach the ideal of equality in the area of public service by
private entrepreneurs. The approach to equality would be to elimi-
nate the gross inequality of pork barrel windfalls from government
allocation. The spectacle of a television licensee receiving a multi-
million dollar windfall which he can collect without rendering equiv-
alent service to the public would be eliminated, and with it one of
the most pointed public displays of unjustified inequality. If we are
to have a public-private state, we must avoid the appearance of
princely largess to court favorites.
There remains the second kind of equality: equality in the sense
of a minimum guarantee of income, services and well-being. In a
planned society, poverty, lack of opportunity and lack of basic services
become increasingly intolerable. Every allocation of resources will be
weighed critically against these unmet basic needs. Hence a planned
society must establish minimum standards for each individual's well-
being-needs that will receive first priority in the nation's budget.
Education, housing, medical care and an income for necessities surely
come within this category. The law should remove them from admin-
istrative discretion, establish them as rights, and safeguard them with
the protections of due process of law. Once again we approach an
area which cannot be discussed in the present article. It must suffice
to say that the concept of a guaranteed minimum would go a long
way toward integrating the ideal of equality with the ideal of plan-
ning.
D. Beyond Planning
Let us assume that planning and allocations can be made more
democratic, more pluralistic and more egalitarian. Is that all that
we should ask of the law? In a society which is not simply majoritarian,
which seeks to protect individuals and minorities as well, the answer
must clearly be no. What is there to prevent planning from reaching
the most private details of an individual's life-from intruding into
an individual's innermost self? Majoritarianism and egalitari-
anism do not necessarily respect the individual. The "public in-
terest," no matter how democratically arrived at, no matter how
broadly conceived, is not by itself an adequate concept of society.
The law must draw a line beyond which planning cannot go.
The starting point for such a line must be the Bill of Rights. The
Constitution marks out the minimum circumference within which
the individual needs to be protected at all costs: speech, conscience,
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and privacy. But the safeguards of the Bill of Rights can be effective
barriers against planning only if they are given a functional inter-
pretation that is meaningful in today's world. I have already sug-
gested, in an earlier part of this article, a functional interpretation
of free speech that would enable it to work effectively in the forma-
tion of planning. Here, in searching for a stopping place for planning,
a functional approach may best be found in the concept of privacy.
Privacy lies behind a number of provisions of the Bill of Rights:
the guarantee of freedom of conscience, the prohibition against quar-
tering soldiers, the right to be free of arbitrary searches and seizures,
the guarantee against loss of liberty or property without due process
of law. Recently privacy received recognition in its own right by the
Supreme Court. The Court held that the Connecticut law prohibiting
the giving of birth control advice to married couples was an un-
constitutional invasion of privacy. From this starting point the right
of privacy should grow-and its growth should be proportional to
the need for it. Americans have always enjoyed a large measure of
privacy. In earlier times privacy received its chief protection from
the institution of private property, the existence of the frontier, and
the mere absence of government from many areas of life. As living
becomes more crowded, and governmental regulation becomes more
pervasive, privacy is constantly more threatened, and must increasingly
depend for its survival upon the protection of positive law. The ob-
jective of such law should be to keep the amount of privacy constant
through changing circumstances and times. Planning must be halted
at the line where belief, artistic expression, domestic affairs, educa-
tion and creativity begin.
It is in meeting the need for an expanding Bill of Rights that the
most crucial function of the courts and of judicial review is to be
found. Courts cannot say what good planning is; at most they can
insist that procedures be followed, parties heard, values mentioned
and jurisdictional limits observed. But when planning confronts the
Bill of Rights the job of the courts is to see to it that each right is
equal to its task. In this sense, the courts may expect an ever higher
role and responsibility in the planned society.
The definition of the area beyond planning is the most vital func-
tion of the law of the planned society. For it is here that the dis-
tinctive quality of America lies. Planning exists in socialist and
capitalist societies alike. And public-private ownership is becoming
common to both societies as private property merges into public in
the United States and emerges from public in the Soviet Union. Even
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the democratic form of government will not long serve to distinguish
the United States from Russia, for just as democracy is changing its
form in the United States, so the Soviet Union is adopting new ma-
chinery to make planning more responsive to public demand. The
distinctiveness of the United States is found-and has always been
found-in its respect for the individual human being.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to urge that we forego the il-
lusion that we do not have planning, recognize the great problems
that planning brings to an open society, and seek new laws to make
the best possible accommodation of planning and liberty. We need
a Constitution for the Welfare State.
The major contemporary problems of constitutional law cluster
around three categories: the functioning of the democratic system,
the distribution of rights and equities in the commonwealth, and the
maintenance of a boundary between the community and the in-
dividual. This article has concentrated on the first. In seeking a more
adequate conception of democracy for today's world, it has taken an
essentially conservative position: it attempts to preserve the outlines
of the American system rather than to abandon it. There is a large
body of opinion which argues that neither democracy nor pluralism
is an appropriate ideal for the twentieth century state. But it is still
possible that we have not given either democracy or pluralism enough
of a chance to show whether they can function in the midst of plan-
ning.
The search for a law for the planned society must be carried on in
light of knowledge that is largely pessimistic. Almost all the evidence
we have argues that when man is in the mass, the faults of human
nature are grossly enlarged and the hard-won virtues swept away.
Faced with the banality and conformity of a mass society, the individ-
ual may find that self-expression and individualization of experience
are possible only by a retreat to a radical subjectivity. But it is still
open to us to make improvements within our society wherever they
are possible. At a minimum, we can clear away some of the pretense
and confusion of administrative law.
The issue is all summed up in the supersonic plane. It can travel
faster from somewhere to somewhere, but its huge cost will take money
from other domestic needs, and its sonic boom menaces those who live
in its path. The President-acting in secret, and without submitting
the question to Congress or the people-has ordered the plane to be
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built, partly, we are told, in order to increase United States prestige.
Is the decision to authorize this plane a wise one? Has our system of
planning been able to make an adequate choice among alternatives?
Is the method of decision consistent with our democratic ideals? Do
we know whether most people would really prefer faster transporta-
tion if they had experienced the invasion of their lives which comes
with it? One night last summer I slept out on the porch of a cottage
by a lake. I woke early in the morning and lay watching the fragile
silence of pines, mist, and water. Suddenly, from a casually passing
plane, came a shattering sonic boom. In that inhuman impact all the
hitherto academic shortcomings of administrative law came home to
me.
